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A. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on remedies and reparation for sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated in 
conflict and post-conflict settings by those with a specific mandate to help: peacekeepers and 
associated personnel and the staff of humanitarian aid agencies.  
 
For many years, the phenomenon was known but not often considered. The victims - often the 
most marginalised in their communities and further isolated and stigmatised by their experiences 
of sexual exploitation and abuse - had little voice and limited opportunity, incentive or trust to 
complain about their ill-treatment and to seek to hold their abusers accountable. Most agencies 
aware of abuses did little to publicly address the problem. Owing to concerns about negative 
publicity which could potentially affect donor funding, supply of troop contingents or other types 
of support and also the fears about subjecting their employees or experts on mission to the whims 
of local justice systems, typically local police were not even informed by agencies of the 
wrongdoing. Simply and quietly, suspect individuals tended to be dismissed and, in the case of 
expatriates, repatriated. Virtually nothing was done to address the harm suffered by victims.  
Over time, this practice evolved. The phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse has 
received more attention, owing to strong, though sporadic, media attention. Inquiries have been 
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instituted to better understand the problems and which have resulted in commitments to impose 
“zero tolerance”. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations have acknowledged the 
problem and developed codes of conduct and frameworks to help deter further abuses. More 
limited progress has been made to improve the prospects for criminal accountability as well as to 
afford support and assistance to victims.  
By contrast, very little has been done to recognise victims’ rights to a remedy and 
reparation, or to ensure procedures to enforce such rights. As will be elaborated in this chapter, 
there is resistance to recognising the beneficiaries of protection or assistance  as rights holders, 
particularly vis-a-vis the peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid agencies mandated to 
provide that protection and assistance.  
 There has been only limited consideration of the absence of reparation for sexual 
exploitation and abuse, both in policy circles and in academia. With respect to 
peacekeeping and UN agencies, the bulk of policy reports have focused on the challenges 
to advance criminal investigations and prosecutions whereas academic literature has 
similarly focused on investigations and prosecutions,1 or on discrete issues such as the 
immunity of peacekeepers and associated personnel,2 the responsibility of troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) for the actions of their troops,3 or the attribution of 
responsibility to the United Nations.4  Reparations for sexual exploitation and abuse has 
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been considered only exceptionally, for example by Simm, who explains the challenges to 
implement principles of responsibility in order to afford reparations to victims;5 by 
REDRESS6 as well as Sweetser7 and Mompontet,8 who have called on the UN to establish 
a framework for compensation, and Simić and O'Brien,9 as well as  Blau, who consider the 
particular context of “peacekeeper babies”, calling for the strengthening of frameworks to 
force individual peacekeepers to support financially the babies born from sexual 
exploitation and abuse,10 and for peacekeeping forces to ensure child support payments. 11    
 The role of humanitarian organisations has received less attention in the literature when 
compared to peacekeeping abuses. Policy and academic studies and reports have considered the 
extent to which humanitarian organisations have included in their programming the care and 
support of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, including reproductive health,12 the 
incidence of transactional sex and related exploitation in post-conflict contexts13 and the challenge 
of reporting allegations.14 More recent studies have focused on safeguarding and wider prevention 
measures, and broader-based studies have begun to consider what might be required to promote 
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NGO transparency and public accountability, also to donors.15 Some studies have considered the 
existence of a duty of care owed by humanitarian agencies to their employees, largely as a result 
of recent litigation brought by employees and their families raising mainly health and safety 
concerns.16  
 Until very recently, much less attention has been given to NGO duties owed towards the 
beneficiaries of aid, to criminal accountability of the perpetrators and even less still to the 
reparation owed to victims. This stands in contrast with the growing number of studies that have 
been carried out to consider the need for, and the adequacy of, reparations measures for sexual 
exploitation and abuse carried out under the guise of other institutions such as the Catholic 
Church,17 or historical sexual abuse allegations engaging the responsibility of government 
agencies.18 Chamallas, for example, charts the use of tort concepts of vicarious liability, 
foreseeability and negligence to bring claims against third-party defendants for the failure to take 
the necessary precautions to prevent sexual assaults.19     
This chapter attempts to fill some of those gaps. It considers the frameworks for 
understanding legal responsibility for sexual exploitation and abuse involving 
peacekeepers and humanitarian actors - who is responsible, for which acts and with what 
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consequences. It analyses the conceptual, legal, institutional and practical barriers to 
reparation and puts forward several recommendations as to how these barriers can be 
overcome.  
Many steps are being taken to address the scourge of sexual exploitation and abuse 
however for transformational change to take hold some fundamental precepts need to be 
confronted and challenged. The recognition and effective implementation of victims’ rights 
is crucial to this transformation. Despite the use of approaches termed as “victim-centred”, 
there is much vested interest in the status quo which tends to relegate victims to the 
sidelines – as the passive recipients of aid and assistance. Until now, this has meant that 
corrective actions have been modest, and they are likely to continue to fail to bring about 
the needed transformation. Much more must be done.  
 
B. The Context of Exploitation and Abuse 
 
The phrase “sexual exploitation and abuse” covers a wide array of acts and scenarios which are 
centrally about abuse of power. The phenomenon may involve instances of actual, attempted or 
threatened rape or other sexual violence in which, often predatory, perpetrators seek to impose 
their will on a victim to carry out sexual acts under duress or fear of further violence. At other 
times sexual exploitation and abuse will appear more transactional, either as a form of organised 
crime or where an individual or group seeks to take advantage of the power imbalance to coerce 
or manipulate vulnerable persons into sexual activity in exchange for something those persons 
need or want, and/or for the financial advantage or increased status of the perpetrator.20 The 
vulnerability of the persons and sometimes the grooming process employed by perpetrators can 
render the victims powerless to recognise the exploitative nature of the relationship and unable to 
give informed consent. However, there can be shades of grey; at times, the poverty or other 
difficult circumstances of persons may lead them willingly towards ‘exploitative’ but seemingly 
consensual relationships with a view to improving status or position, even on a temporary basis.  
Sexual exploitation and abuse is a gendered phenomenon, which disproportionately affects 
women and girls; structural aspects of discrimination and inequality between women and men have 
historically placed women and girls at a disadvantage. However, boys and young men are often 
targeted as well, and ‘in fact, when men and boys are subjected to sexual violence the intent is 
gendered in nature, that is, it seeks to emasculate.’21 
The phenomenon takes place in all societies. It is fuelled by the demand for sexual services 
on the one hand and vulnerability and unequal power relations on the other. Victims tend to come 
from circumstances in which they are marginalised and have less economic or social protections. 
This might include but is not limited to, children separated from their parents, in care or residential 
school settings; persons living under severe economic hardship and helplessness; homeless 
persons; migrants and displaced persons; people living in conflict or natural disaster zones or in 
the aftermath of same. Displacement related to armed conflict often leads to the types of 
breakdown of social networks and other forms of personal and community support that can fuel 
sexual exploitation and abuse.22 
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Peacekeepers, including military contingents, police and other civilian personnel, as well 
as humanitarian aid workers (including UN agency personnel and staff of humanitarian 
organisations) working in post conflict or disaster zones are not immune from these abuses, 
regardless of the type of work they are engaged in or their role within the organisation, ‘from 
guards and drivers to senior managers’, and ‘a mix of local, national and international personnel.’23  
In addition to the abuse of vulnerable members of the local population who these 
organisations are mandated to protect or afford support, there is also evidence of cases of sexual 
harassment and abuse within and between organisations. For the foreign recruits, they tend to be 
enmeshed in a “macho”, male dominated culture with the sense that the day-to-day context they 
are facing – sometimes, though not always, a hostile, volatile or insecure environment - is “unreal.” 
Personnel are away from their families, sometimes living in security bunkers in a “camp” 
mentality; the moral codes from back home can seem distant and inapplicable. The national staff 
are equally affected by the power imbalances which can foster sexual exploitation and abuse. They 
may be vulnerable to abuse by “more powerful” colleagues within their organisations, for fear of 
losing their typically insecure jobs or other benefits. But, at the same time national staff are also 
engaged in abusive conduct vis-à-vis more vulnerable members of the local population.  
According to a recent United Kingdom Parliamentary Inquiry, the ‘[e]vidence … suggests 
that sexual exploitation and abuse is endemic across the international aid sector.’24 Similarly, in 
respect of abuse by peacekeepers and associated personnel, it has been stated that ‘the problem 
remains a substantial one’;25 ‘[t]he UN has recorded over 2,000 allegations of sexual abuse and 
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exploitation by UN peacekeeping and other personnel around the world over a thirteen year 
period’,26 and the cases keep coming. These framings of the scale of the problem persist despite 
evidence of underreporting.27 
When these groups engage in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse they not only take 
advantage of unequal power relations within the society but also breach the duty of care they have 
towards local populations on account of their protective mandates.   
The consequences for victims can be severe. Sexual exploitation and abuse can damage 
victims’ health, produce high rates of trauma, anxiety and depression, impede welfare and 
development and lead to lost educational and skills training as well as employment opportunities. 
It can also increase victims’ vulnerability to further violence. Many of the harms arising from 
sexual exploitation and abuse are gender-specific, including vaginal injuries, increased risk of 
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV, forced pregnancies, abortions and teenage motherhood. In 
addition to the severe psychological consequences often experienced by victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, these victims are often also subjected to external pressures in the form of 
social, community and family stigma embedded in the cultural notions of female chastity, purity 
and feminine gender roles. Men and boys are also stigmatised; the experience of sexual 
exploitation and abuse is shameful to them and their families; it is inconsistent with the male 
stereotypes they must embody.28 Victims often face social exclusion and isolation, as well as, in 
extreme cases, revictimisation, physical and sexual violence as forms of gender-based persecution 
and punishment. The abuse can also impact families, and communities. 
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C. Key narratives and policy responses 
 
1. Some underlying narratives 
 
a. Preservation of image and damage control  
The UN has refrained from accepting characterisations such as ‘widescale’, ‘widespread’, 
‘endemic’ when referring to sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers and 
associated personnel as well as the staff of UN agencies. The UN Security Council has referred to 
‘the serious and continuous allegations’,29 and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations has recognised ‘the gravity of the problem.’30 However, both the 
Security Council and General Assembly have underscored repeatedly that ‘the United Nations 
should not let the performance failures of a few tarnish the achievements of the whole’.31 But, 
sexual exploitation and abuse is hardly a problem of the few. And, as Grady notes, when one 
endeavours to ‘paint the perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse as a few “bad apples”, it is 
no longer necessary to scrutinise the structural features of this issue or of UN policy, and 
particularly the role that law plays.32 The supposed absence of systematicity obviates the need for 
such scrutiny. The touchiness to words like ‘widespread’ or ‘systemic’ can be seen in the UN’s 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) response to a report concerning sexual exploitation 
of refugees by aid workers in West Africa, in which the independent investigators characterised 
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the level of abuse as ‘widespread’.33 The OIOS which carried out a subsequent investigation – the 
conclusions of which have been criticised34 -, affirmed that ‘the impression given in the 
consultants’ report that sexual exploitation by aid workers, in particular sex for services, was 
widespread is misleading and untrue.’35 Grady, who analysed the annual UN reporting of statistics 
on new cases and the inferences drawn by the UN therefrom, is highly critical: 
So, first, the increase in allegations is in part a consequence of better UN reporting and 
other mechanisms, and second, but for the UN policy the level of allegations would be even 
higher. Leaving aside the apparent contradiction in the argument, it is difficult to find any 
evidence in the report to support this view. The use of this ‘UN speak’ in the annual reports 
seems emblematic of the fact that, as the 2015 Deschamps Review into sexual exploitation 
and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic identified, 
‘the UN is more concerned with rhetoric than action.’ It also gives the impression that the 
zero tolerance policy will be deemed a success regardless of what happens to the numbers 
of allegations. Heads I win, tails you lose.36 
 
Somewhat similar criticisms of underplaying the seriousness and systematicity have been levied 
at the aid sector. The UK Parliament has accused the humanitarian aid community of responding 
to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse with ‘a reactive, cyclical approach, driven by 
concern for reputational management.’37 It reported, in relation to revelations about Oxfam’s 
response to allegations in Haiti, ‘the accusations that Oxfam failed to report the matter to the 
Charity Commission, DFID, or any other authority in clear terms, for fear of reputational damage. 
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In doing so, the organisation exacerbated the risk of allowing the perpetrators to be re-employed 
within the sector and prevented the issue from being aired and tackled effectively.’38 In respect of 
the scale of the problem, it determined that ‘[t]he sector as a whole needs to confront the fact that, 
although the exact scale remains unknown, sexual exploitation and abuse is happening and it is 
happening across organisations, countries and institutions. It is endemic, and it has been for a long 
time. Outrage is appropriate, but surprise is not.’39 
 
b. Limitation of liability; refocusing blame 
Sexual exploitation and abuse during peacekeeping can entail both individual responsibility 
(criminal and civil) as well as institutional responsibility  - to the extent that the institution or body 
to whom the individual perpetrator reports was negligent or otherwise failed to exercise due 
diligence to protect the local population from the foreseeable acts of those under its charge.40 The 
acceptance of one form of responsibility does not preclude other forms of responsibility; they can 
both exist at the same time.  
In general terms the UN has accepted that, when it exercises effective control (which would 
typically be the case in peacekeeping missions operating under a UN mandate), any wrongful 
conduct would be attributable to the organization for the purposes of assessing institutional 
responsibility.41 Nevertheless, in its policy documents concerning sexual exploitation and abuse, 
it has articulated the position that others alone (and not it) are responsible for the various harms 
connected to sexual exploitation and abuse; its sole role is ‘supporting efforts of troop contributing 
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countries to investigate and prosecute criminal allegations and encouraging states to address 
paternity and child support claims, and to ‘explore the possible use of ex gratia payments to 
victims’.42 Yet, while it is correct that under status of forces agreements, troop contributing 
countries have sole jurisdiction to prosecute the members of military contingents who are accused 
of a crime while on mission,43 this fact should have no bearing on any potential institutional 
liability in the case of a breach of a duty of care or related wrongful conduct concerning sexual 
exploitation and abuse.44 Multiple allocations of responsibility are possible, and depending on the 
causal relationship of the responsibility with the ensuing damage, this may give rise to multiple 
obligations to afford reparation, depending on the circumstances.45  
In contrast, the humanitarian aid community has tended to ignore the issue of liability 
altogether.46 It has focused on the protection of and support to vulnerable people as opposed to 
recognising and putting in place measures to address the rights of individuals who have already 
suffered harm. Naturally there is a conflict of interest; charities will not necessarily be interested 
to expose themselves to liability if they can help it. But therein lies the problem; the charities are 
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the route by which victims can exercise their agency; but the space given to them for that purpose 
is limited.  
   
2. Public narratives and policy responses 
 
The main public narratives and policy responses that have been used to explain and address the 
problem are summarised below. These tend to overlap both in time as well as in emphasis. 
 
a. Prevention and safeguarding 
Prevention was an important aspect of the 2003 special measures bulletin aimed at staff of the 
United Nations, and focused on clarifying impermissible conduct and what managers should be 
doing when that conduct comes to light.47 It also featured in the Zeid report,48 and became the 
focus of many of the first UN policy responses to sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly, 
training, backed up with awareness raising and risk assessment.49 Pre-deployment training has 
become routine for international civilian staff. Troop- and police-contributing countries are 
responsible for, and have committed to, providing mandatory pre-deployment training for their 
contingents. Pre-deployment training is followed up with induction and refresher training sessions. 
Awareness raising includes information sharing on standards of acceptable behaviour and how the 
local population can make a complaint or alert to potential problems. Risk assessments are 
intended to identify problems areas and to take mitigation actions, and in addition screening is 
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aimed at avoiding the hiring onto new missions of individuals who have carried out sexual 
exploitation and abuse in other locations. None of these measures work seamlessly, however there 
is a sense of progressive improvements.  
In the humanitarian aid context, the buzzword is ‘safeguarding’, but essentially it refers to 
the same thing – preventing the abuses from happening in the first place, putting in place robust 
standards of conduct and training staff. An inter-agency standing committee,50 made up of UN 
agencies and several large humanitarian NGOs, has provided advice to the UN, produced codes of 
conduct and other practical guidance and tools for agencies. In 2009, it commissioned a review of 
actions taken to combat sexual exploitation and abuse and reported on its findings in 2010.51 It 
noted the progress with the adoption of policies but underscored the challenges for these to be 
implemented on the ground.52 The UK Parliamentary inquiry recommended several measures to 
improve prevention such as stronger safeguarding measures, which is already having an effect. 
Some government agencies and larger humanitarian organizations are now requiring grantees and 
sub-grantees to demonstrate adequate internal safeguarding policies as a condition to receive 
grants. Other recommendations include a global register of aid workers, a “passport” for aid 
workers to provide background information and vetting status as well as a new disclosure of 
misconduct scheme across the NGO sector to prevent known perpetrators from moving around 
undetected.53 While important, as there has been so few formal investigations and very little 
criminal accountability, many of these latter measures are difficult to implement as the information 
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upon which aid workers would be vetted (allegations of criminal and abusive or exploitative 
conduct which has not necessarily been subject to any testing) would be so speculative. 
  
b. Criminal accountability 
The need to investigate allegations – to better understand the nature and scale of the issues and to 
ensure criminal accountability of perpetrators, is essential. In the context of peacekeeping 
operations, status of forces agreements specify that troop contributing countries are solely 
responsible for prosecuting their formed troop contingents. All other accused persons – whether 
they are police contingents, civilian personnel or experts on mission, can be prosecuted by the host 
state under its domestic law, but are more likely to be repatriated to their countries of origin. 
Whether they will face prosecution back home will depend on a confluence of factors, including 
the nature of the allegations (some of which will not be criminalised), whether the criminal law 
allows for extraterritorial prosecutions of sexual exploitation and abuse (in many countries this 
will only apply to cases involving children), or political will, which is often dependent on media 
and civil society pressure.54 Already in 2006, a number of significant recommendations were made 
to address the legal lacunae, including recommending a much greater role for the host state and a 
proposal for a draft convention,55 however debates stalled. Instead, there has been piecemeal 
progress with investigations as a result of revisions to the memorandum of understanding between 
troop contributing countries and the UN and other small adjustments, and greater scrutiny of the 
follow up of allegations.  
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The staff of humanitarian NGOs are subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal law of the 
host state (and potentially also, their home state), but as was found by the UK Parliamentary 
Inquiry, often the humanitarian NGOs fail to inform the local authorities when allegations arise. 
Consequently, impunity and weak vetting processes mean that perpetrators can end up being 
transferred to other locales and the problem simply repeats itself. As a result of recent public 
scandals, the obligation for staff to report any abuse they suspect or witness, whether within their 
own organisation or outside, has been incorporated into standard-setting texts.56 
 
c. Victim support 
The importance of victim support was highlighted in the Zeid report57 but took on a more central 
policy focus in 2008, with the adoption of the UN Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and 
Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related 
Personnel.58 This policy sets in motion a framework for assistance and support to be provided with 
the aid of a trust fund ‘through existing services, programmes and their networks’, and ‘where 
necessary, […] new services.’59 This was followed in 2009 with the inter-agency task force Victim 
Assistance Guide,60 and extended and further clarified in the annual reports of the Secretary-
General on the topic.  
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But crucially, support provided by the UN was not understood as a reparative element 
stemming from any wrong committed. There was never any sense of a requirement to afford 
assistance; it was simply something that was seen as appropriate, a useful humanitarian policy to 
pursue. The 2008 comprehensive strategy makes this clear - it ‘does not deal with compensation’; 
‘[t]he Strategy shall in no way diminish or replace the individual responsibility for acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, which rests with the perpetrators’.61 A similar statement has been 
incorporated into the 2009 Victim Assistance Guide: 
The SEA [Sexual Exploitation and Abuse] Victim Assistance Mechanism does not replace 
or negate the responsibility of perpetrators of acts of sexual exploitation and abuse, who 
should be held accountable for their actions both legally and financially. The assistance 
provided by the United Nations or any other organization does not in any way diminish or 
replace individual responsibility. Likewise, the provision of assistance does not serve as an 
acknowledgment of the validity of the claims, a form of compensation nor an indication of 
acceptance of responsibility by the alleged perpetrator.62 
 
Of note, trust funds are often implemented as a means to afford a measure of reparations, given 
the difficulties for victims to pursue compensation or other remedies through a court process, 
particularly in the context of mass violence. However, these do not displace the reparations 
obligation.   The independent panel of investigators in relation to the Central African Republic 
incidents have made this clear, when they qualify their support for the creation of the UN’s trust 
fund for sexual exploitation and abuse: ‘As a matter of principle, victims of conflict related sexual 
violence should be compensated. … . In recognition of the difficulty faced by victims in accessing 
a remedy in such circumstances, victims should have access to the common trust fund proposed 
by the Secretary-General. The trust fund is not intended to compensate individual victims in the 
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form of reparations, but it would assist in the provision of the specialized services victims of sexual 
violence require.’63  
Nonetheless, even the limited support on offer was difficult to access because of the need 
to demonstrate proof of the abuse – which, due to the deficient investigations, was often lacking.64 
Also, inter-agency cooperation to arrange support has been difficult and cumbersome.65 The UN 
Office of Internal Oversight Services noted in a 2015 report that:  
[t]he Organization’s lack of success in assisting victims of sexual exploitation and abuse is 
of serious concern as very few have been assisted. Details of the assistance provided are 
scant, suggesting that the Organization has been unable to devise structures that are 
sufficiently dynamic to compensate for victims’ powerlessness. Additionally, it is apparent 
that there are pressing unmet financial issues underlying victim assistance that must be 
addressed within policy frameworks rather than alleviated depending on staff members’ 
generosity.66 
 
Similar criticisms were made by the independent investigators who reviewed the UN response to 
the 2014 allegations against French peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. Victims’ 
welfare ‘appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all.’67 
Efforts to refine and strengthen victim assistance have continued, ultimately resulting in 
the release of the Secretary-General’s new approach in 2017, which was designed to ‘dramatically 
improve how the United Nations addresses this problem.’68 As part of this new approach, a system 
of victim rights advocates was unleashed to strengthen victims’ voices and agency,69 though in 
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practice it has served mainly as a vehicle to communicate the UN’s established policies. Instead 
of being empowered through a reparations process, the victims await ‘support’ which is piecemeal.  
Similarly, humanitarian NGOs have not set up mechanisms for victims to claim 
reparations.70 Standard-setting texts refer to the importance of victim assistance as part of effective 
community based complaints mechanisms,71 and is understood to entail – at least in principle – 
‘medical, legal, psychosocial and immediate material care as well as the facilitation of the pursuit 
of paternity and child support claims. Direct financial assistance should not be provided under the 
SEA/VAM. The nature and scope of the assistance to be provided is determined on a case-by-case 
basis and depends on the services which are locally available to other GBV survivors.’72  
D. Legal obligations to afford reparation (what they are and who has them) 
 
1. Human rights framework 
 
States are bound to respect, protect and fulfil those human rights obligations that form part of their 
treaty obligations, their domestic law as well as applicable customary international law binding on 
all states. In certain contexts, international organizations with “international legal personality” may 
similarly take on human rights obligations, to the extent that they have agreed to be bound and/or 
the obligations are required to fulfill their mandates.73 There are multiple actors involved in 
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peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and “effective control”74 – the criterion for determining 
obligations under international law - may be difficult to ascertain. The commission of sexual 
exploitation and abuse may engage the responsibility of several actors: the troop contributing 
country, the host state and/or the United Nations in the case of a peacekeeping mission operating 
under the auspices of the UN.  
A human rights framework necessarily takes account of the rights of victims and potential 
victims and in particular, protecting them from harm. Adopting a human rights-based approach to 
sexual exploitation and abuse requires that those with the human rights obligation act with due 
diligence towards the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, the protection of victims and 
the prosecution of perpetrators. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women has made clear that the failure ‘to take all appropriate measures to prevent acts of gender-
based violence against women when its authorities know or should know of the danger of violence, 
or a failure to investigate, prosecute and punish, and to provide reparation to victims/survivors of 
such acts, provides tacit permission or encouragement to acts of gender-based violence against 
women. These failures or omissions constitute human rights violations.’75 The African 
Commission articulated this as ensuring that agents acting on their behalf or under their effective 
control refrain from committing any acts of sexual violence. States must adopt the necessary 
legislative and regulatory measures to act with due diligence to prevent and investigate acts of 
sexual violence committed by state and non-state actors, prosecute and punish perpetrators, and 
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provide remedies to victims.’76 The due diligence standard, should be triggered as soon as the 
relevant authorities know or ought to have known about sexual exploitation and abuse taking place 
within its territory or jurisdiction, by either state or non-state actors.  
It follows that there will be an obligation to provide reparation if there has been a failure 
to take reasonable steps to prevent the prohibited behaviour and protect potential or actual victims 
of such exploitation and abuse, to the required standard of due diligence.77 What would constitute 
appropriate forms of reparation would depend on the circumstances, but would usually include 
measures such as restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.78  
The importance and relevance of reparations to address aspects of gender-based violence 
including sexual abuse has been underscored repeatedly. For instance, the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women has made clear that reparations should include 
different measures, such as monetary compensation and the provision of legal, social and health 
services including sexual, reproductive and mental health for a complete recovery, and satisfaction 
and guarantees of non-repetition.79 It recommended that states provide effective and timely 
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remedies for all gender-based violations, including sexual and reproductive rights violations, 
domestic and sexual enslavement, forced marriage and forced displacement, sexual violence and 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.80 The UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in 
persons, especially women and children, developed with the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights a set of basic principles on the right to an effective remedy for trafficked persons.81 
These basic principles underscore that ‘Victims of trafficking in persons, as victims of human 
rights violations, have the right to an effective remedy for any harm committed against them’.82 
Further it recognises that all states shall provide adequate, effective and prompt remedies to victims 
when the state is legally responsible for any harm committed against them; ‘this includes when 
harm is attributable to the state or when the state has failed to exercise due diligence to prevent 
trafficking, to investigate and prosecute traffickers, and to assist and protect victims of trafficking 
in persons’.83 Also, it sets out particular remedies for child victims, taking into account their best 
interests.84 Access to reparations for conflict-related sexual violence is understood to be so seminal 
that the UN Secretary-General has indicated that ‘The UN cannot endorse peace agreements which 
preclude either access to judicial remedies or administrative reparations programmes for victims 
of conflict-related sexual violence and other gross violations of international human rights law, as 
well as serious violations of international humanitarian law.’85  
In the Cotton Fields case – which concerned the abduction, killing and sexual violence of 
two minors and a young woman by non-state actors in Mexico and the subsequent failure of the 
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state to diligently investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights determined that Mexico’s failure to exercise due diligence violated the women’s 
rights and required it to provide a variety of reparation measures to the victims, which should 
among other factors, have a direct connection with the violations, should repair in a proportional 
manner pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, and should be oriented to identify and eliminate 
the structural factors of discrimination.86  
Recommendations have been made by UN treaty bodies to the Holy See in respect of its 
failure to exercise due diligence to address child sexual exploitation and abuse in the Catholic 
Church. For instance, the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the Holy See to:  
(a) Conduct an internal investigation into the conduct of religious personnel working in the 
Magdalene laundries in Ireland as well as in all countries where this system was in place, 
and ensure that all those responsible for the offences be sanctioned and reported to national 
judicial authorities for prosecution purposes;  
(b) Ensure that full compensation be paid to the victims and their families either through 
the congregations themselves or through the Holy See as supreme power of the Church and 
legally responsible for its subordinates in Catholic religious orders placed under its 
authority;  
(c) Take all appropriate measures to ensure the physical and psychological recovery and 
social reintegration of the victims of these offences; and  
(d) Assess the circumstances and reasons which have led to such practices and take all 
necessary measures to ensure that no women and children can be arbitrarily confined for 
whatever reason in Catholic institutions in the future.87 
 
Similarly, the Committee Against Torture has recommended the Holy See to:  
(a) In accordance with article 14 of the Convention and General Comment No. 3, take steps 
to ensure that victims of sexual abuse committed by or with the acquiescence of the State 
party’s officials receive redress, including fair, adequate and enforceable right to 
compensation and as full rehabilitation as possible, regardless of whether perpetrators of 
such acts have been brought to justice. Appropriate measures should be taken to ensure the 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of the victims of abuse;  
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(b) Encourage the provision of redress by individual religious orders to victims of 
violations of the Convention carried out by them and take additional steps to ensure that 
victims obtain redress as needed, including in the case of the Magdalene Laundries.88 
 
In addition to the reparations measures themselves, human rights policy frameworks have 
underscored the importance for victims to be involved in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of reparation programmes, bearing in mind local contexts and the transformative 
potential of reparations.89  
Despite the plethora of policies and standard-setting texts which have clarified in human 
rights terms, the obligations to afford effective remedies and reparations for different forms of 
gender-based violence, these were not incorporated into the UN policy frameworks for addressing 
sexual exploitation and abuse on the context of peacekeeping, even in the latest iterations of such 
frameworks which are said to promote a so-called “victim-centred” approach.90 Westendorp and 
Searle make this point, ‘While the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1985 clearly established norms of access to justice 
and fair treatment, restitution, compensation and assistance, these were not applied by the UN or 
member states to peacekeeper SEA, highlighting the way in which issues relating to SEA have 
been isolated from other relevant policy frameworks.’91 They later go on to explain, in the context 
of significant incidents in the Central African Republic, that ‘the Secretary-General declared to the 
UNSC that the Secretariat alone could not adequately address the ‘global scourge’ of SEA by 
troops in peace operations, and placed responsibility for ensuring justice for victims ‘squarely’ on 
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TCCs.’92 Presumably, they refer to the laudable efforts by the UN Secretariat to get troop 
contributing countries to acknowledge greater responsibility. However, my view is that there is an 
additional purpose – which is to remove the gaze away from the UN. In fact, the UN retains 
responsibility for any due diligence failing attributable to it in respect of acts which occurred on 
missions over which it had effective control, any responsibility of troop contributing countries 
notwithstanding.     
The findings of the independent panel of investigators of the UN response to incidents in 
the Central African Republic go even further. Sexual exploitation and abuse should be understood 
as a violation of basic human rights and as a form of conflict related sexual violence, triggering 
the UN’s protection responsibilities: 
Whereas the SEA policies are centred on the perpetrator, the human rights policies look at 
the victim first. The human rights policy framework becomes operative where the UN 
receives a report of a victim who has suffered a human rights violation, regardless of the 
affiliation of the perpetrator. In such cases, the UN has an obligation to investigate the 
incident, report on any violation, protect the victim, and to promote accountability. When 
viewed through the lens of the human rights policy framework, conflict related sexual 
violence by peacekeepers is not merely a disciplinary matter, but a serious human rights 
violation.93 
 
2. Tort law framework  
 
The law of torts provides a private remedy (usually in the form of civil damages) for any personal 
injury, loss or harm suffered by a person as a direct result of a breach of a duty.  It is a common 
law principle; the equivalent in the civil law or Napoleonic legal tradition is the notion of delict – 
which consists of an intentional or negligent breach of duty of care that inflicts loss or harm and 
triggers legal liability for the wrongdoer. 
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Under the concept of tort or delict, there is a need to show that the wrongdoer owed a duty 
of care to the claimant. A duty of care is a legal obligation which requires a person to adhere to a 
standard of reasonable behaviour when carrying out any act or providing a product or service that 
could foreseeably cause harm to others. It will usually involve a relationship of trust (e.g. – doctor 
and patient; school and student; restaurant chef and diner; manufacturer and consumer). Agencies 
and organisations that work with vulnerable populations and have an explicit or implicit mandate 
to protect those populations from harm, are clearly involved in a relationship of trust with the 
beneficiaries of that protection. There is a need to show that the duty of care was breached, and 
that any harm that was produced was caused by the breach.   
In some contexts, a person, company or other actor might be vicariously liable for the 
tortious acts or omissions of their employee or other person who acts under them. So, a government 
may be liable for damages for the tortious actions of a prison guard when falsely imprisoning or 
abusing an inmate, or a company may be responsible for the actions of its employee for improperly 
labelling the ingredients on food packaging which led to the death of a consumer.  
In principle, an employer may be vicariously liable for the employee who commits sexual 
exploitation and abuse in the course of their employment. The employer may owe a duty of care 
to their staff to ensure a safe work environment, whatever and wherever that may be and to take 
practical steps to protect them against any reasonably foreseeable risks they face. Somewhat less 
clear is the circumstances in which an employer owes a duty of care too persons other than 
employees – e.g., to the purchasers of services or the beneficiaries of aid. Chamallis, who has 
studied such tort actions mainly in the United States, has determined that many courts are reluctant 
to impose vicarious liability in cases of sexual abuse.94 She determines that cases have had more 
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chance of success when they have been framed as negligence claims, pointing ‘to some fault on 
the part of the third-party defendant, usually meaning some failure to take the necessary 
precautions to prevent the plaintiff’s sexual assault,’ for example ‘church officials were negligent 
in hiring, supervising, and retaining priests with a record of sexual abuse and in failing to report 
the abuse to the local authorities. The practice of simply transferring an offending priest to another 
parish, without informing the new parish of any prior incidents or allegations, came under fire and 
forced the church to re-evaluate its protocols for handling cases of clergy sexual abuse’, or women 
raped in hotels or shopping malls when the owners failed to supply appropriate lighting or security 
guards.95   
Thus in principle, following Chamallis’ argument, a victim of sexual exploitation or abuse 
may be able to sue an international organisation or a humanitarian agency or NGO for negligence, 
for having failed to put in place appropriate measures to prevent the exploitation and abuse which 
was foreseeable in the context. What would constitute “appropriate measures” would depend on 
the circumstances and would be a criterion of reasonableness of steps taken as opposed to result. 
Nevertheless, it is an avenue worthy of exploration. Clearly, the United Nations is immune from 
private suit and has not established any alternative modes of settlement by which claimants can 
pursue claims against the organization.96 Part of its arguments for failing to put in place an 
alternative mode of settlement is its view that it would be inappropriate to utilise public funds to 
submit to any form of litigation with the claimants to address anything more substantial than 
compensation for car accidents or contractual disputes.97 Somehow the humanitarian mandate of 
                                                          
95 Ibid. 
96 Considered in Ferstman (n 73) and Ferstman (n 42). 
97 Ferstman (n 42), 53-4. 
the UN makes a claim in damages inappropriate or unseemly. This extraordinary argument and the 
gap it produces notwithstanding, clarity in how a claim could be framed is a small step forward.   
In contrast, international humanitarian organizations like Oxfam or Save the Children have 
no immunity from suit.  It is perfectly feasible to argue that if an organisation has a duty to 
terminate or discipline employees who engage in exploitation or abuse, they should also have a 
duty to compensate victims when they fail to take such action. Given what is known about sexual 
exploitation and abuse, it is a foreseeable risk that organisations should plan for and take 
appropriate steps to prevent and mitigate. Their failure to do so makes them negligent for the 
ensuing behaviour. But going even beyond this, it is employees’ position of power vis-à-vis the 
local population, fostered by the way in which humanitarian organisations operate in emergency 
and even development contexts that makes the exploitation and abuse possible. In this sense, the 
sexual exploitation and abuse becomes a feature of the employment – it is inextricably tied to that 
type of employment. The vicarious liability of the organization is thus something that should 
continue to be pursued and put to courts as it aligns with the reality of how sexual exploitation and 
abuse happens.    
E. The practical barriers to pursuing reparations claims  
 
1. Claims against the UN 
 
As indicated earlier, wrongful conduct occurring in the context of a UN mandated mission would 
be attributable to the UN for the purposes of assessing institutional responsibility and the 
concomitant obligation to afford reparations. If the mission is UN mandated, then it would 
constitute a subsidiary body of the UN and any actions which occur in the course of the conduct 
of the mission would constitute acts of the organization.  
The status of forces agreements only refer to a small number of private claims which can 
be adjudicated against the UN mission itself through a standing claims commission. Large scale 
abuses such as the failure to exercise due diligence to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse or the 
vicarious liability or negligence of the organisation, are not covered. The UN has argued that only 
the individual perpetrators and the troop contributing country are responsible for reparations.98 
Leaving the questionable merits of that argument aside, as there is no venue to challenge that 
contention given institutional immunities and the lack of standing of individuals to pursue claims 
against the organization, the victims have had no avenue to pursue a claim.  
 
2. Claims against the humanitarian organization 
 
A claim against a humanitarian organization can be lodged for negligence and potentially vicarious 
liability in respect of an employee’s conduct. It could be brought in the courts of the host state, 
which may be simpler and more accessible for victims based there, though potentially unreliable 
and inaccessible in a post-conflict context. Civil courts are notoriously difficult, costly and time-
consuming to navigate. A claim could also be brought in the country where the organization is 
registered or headquartered, if the court determines that it is the most appropriate forum.99  
In addition to the significant challenge for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse to 
organise and find the finances to hire lawyers and mount an effective claim, unless there are robust 
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discovery processes, it may be difficult for the victims to prove negligence to the requisite 
standard, given their limited vantage point in terms of the evidence. If the claim is brought in the 
host state, it will be difficult for the court in that country to compel an international humanitarian 
organization that is no longer active in that country to cooperate. Frameworks for the recognition 
of foreign civil rulings and judgments are notoriously weak. 
 
3. Claims against the troop contributing or home country of the wrongdoer 
 
The possibility for a victim of sexual exploitation and abuse to lodge a claim against a foreign state 
is very limited, despite the UN Secretary-General’s request ‘that Member States receive claims 
from victims and call upon Member States to establish the mechanisms to do so.’100 As with any 
extraterritorial claim, it will be difficult for victims in the host state to organise, secure the funding, 
hire competent counsel and navigate a foreign legal jurisdiction in order to pursue a claim. As is 
explained by REDRESS,  
most victims will not be in a position to pursue claims against the perpetrators, unless 
specialised claims processes are developed specifically for that purpose. Access of victims 
to that jurisdiction may pose the biggest obstacle. The victims would need to find and 
instruct lawyers, and be prepared to travel to the jurisdiction to present evidence before the 
foreign court, both of which are costly and cumbersome prospects. Also, not all countries 
where the offenders are located will recognise the ability for foreign persons to lodge 
claims about events which occurred outside of the territory. The majority of sexual 
exploitation and abuse victims are extremely marginalised within their own post-conflict 
communities. The idea that they would be able to navigate a complex legal process 
involving multiple legal systems, immunities, and overcome the gaps in evidence derived 
from faulty investigations, even with the most zealous legal counsel is simply an illusion.101 
 
                                                          
100 UN Secretary-General, ‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach’ UN 
Doc A/71/818, 28 February 2017, para. 35. 
101 REDRESS (n 6), 38. 
These practical difficulties are compounded by the added challenges to prove that the foreign state 
bears responsibility for the harm, which would only be theoretically possible if the wrongdoer was 
an employee of the state at the time of the wrongdoing (e.g., a member of the military seconded to 
the peacekeeping mission). For instance, it might be possible to argue that, despite its certification 
to the contrary, the foreign state failed to vet the personnel it put forward to serve with the UN 
before deployment, or failed to provide mandatory pre-deployment training on sexual exploitation 
and abuse, etc.  
There is limited anecdotal information about ex gratia payments102 though no known 
instances in which a court has found a troop contributing or home country of the wrongdoer liable 
for damages for sexual exploitation and abuse.    
 
4. Claims against the individual wrongdoer 
 
For the most part, peacekeepers and associated personnel and the staff of humanitarian aid 
agencies, are in the host state temporarily. An exception is locally recruited staff, contractors and 
volunteers, though these may be judgment-proof after the end of the mission.  
After an allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse is made, it is usual that the alleged 
wrongdoer, if an expatriate, leaves the country, usually at the insistence of the employer. It is 
unusual for alleged wrongdoers to be detained by the host country. Once the individual is outside 
the country, extraterritorial claims for damages will be difficult to pursue, for many of the same 
reasons set out in section E.3 above.  
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There are a small number of instances in which civil claims for paternity are being pursued 
by victims in the host state, where the victims are located, yet the cases will only succeed with 
significant assistance and support by the peacekeeping mission and the troop-contributing. In the 
only known public case, Haitian victims with the support of local and international NGOs, filed a 
claim for child support before Haitian courts. However, counsel for the victims blames the UN for 
failing to facilitate those claims:   
since August 2016, the BAI [Bureau des Avocats Internationaux] has advocated in and out 
of court for its clients to obtain this assistance and cooperation from the UN. Yet, for over 
two years, the UN has remained non-responsive, non-cooperative and opaque in its 
approach, failing to provide essential evidentiary documentation and adequate and 
transparent assistance to clients. Your organization is now circumventing the BAI’s legal 
representation and failing to comply with court orders that would facilitate Haitian court 
processes. The UN’s lack of follow-through with its commitment to victims has made it 
nearly impossible for our clients to obtain justice in reality.103 
There is no known case that has been successfully concluded, not least enforced within or outside 
of the country.  
F. Conclusions 
 
There is currently no reparation for sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated in conflict and post-
conflict settings by peacekeepers and associated personnel and the staff of humanitarian aid 
agencies. There is no good reason capable of justifying this exceptional gap.  
The fixation with treating the survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse solely as potential 
beneficiaries of charity and assistance ignores their rights to remedies and reparation, whether 
those rights are framed under human rights law or the private law of tort. Reparation is not a perfect 
solution and will undoubtedly not serve all of victims’ interests; it is particularly difficult to 
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implement especially in contexts of extreme poverty and where there is often little proof of the 
underlying crimes. But it is not impossible to implement; there is an array of experience in 
providing locally accessible, context-specific and affirmative reparation measures. The difficulties 
associated with it do not justify the failure to put systems in place to afford it. In addition to the 
potential benefits to the victims themselves, reparations can underscore the wrongdoing and 
empower the victims, it can also serve as a catalyst to change institutional behaviour in order to 
avoid recurrence. This is particularly important with systemic violations like sexual exploitation 
and abuse.   
The failure to afford reparation – to even have a conversation with victims about their rights 
to reparation and what this might entail – is simply a consolidation and extension of the abuse of 
power they have already experienced. 
